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Abstract—With the benefits of Internet of Vehicles (IoV)
paradigm, come along unprecedented security challenges. Among
many applications of inter-connected systems, vehicular networks
and smart cars are examples that are already rolled out.
Smart vehicles not only have networks connecting their internal
components e.g. via Controller Area Network (CAN) bus, but also
are connected to the outside world through road side units and
other vehicles. In some cases, the internal and external network
packets pass through the same hardware and are merely isolated
by software defined rules. Any misconfiguration opens a window
for the hackers to intrude into vehicles’ internal components
e.g. central lock system, Engine Control Unit (ECU), Anti-lock
Braking System (ABS) or Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) system.
Compromise of any of these can lead to disastrous outcomes.
In this paper, we study the security of smart vehicles’ adaptive
cruise control systems in the presence of covert attacks. We define
two covert/stealth attacks in the context of cruise control and
propose a novel intrusion detection and compensation method to
disclose and respond to such attacks. More precisely, we focus on
the covert cyber attacks that compromise the integrity of cruise
controller and employ a neural network identifier in the IDS
engine to estimate the system output dynamically and compare it
against the ACC output. If any anomaly is detected, an embedded
substitute controller kicks in and takes over the control. We
conducted extensive experiments in MATLAB to evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed scheme in a simulated environment.
Index Terms—Internet of Vehicles, Cyber Physical Systems,
Software Defined Networks, Vehicular Ad hoc Networks, Car
Cruise Control, Intrusion Detection, Covert Attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
INTRUSION Detection Systems (IDS), in their classic defi-nition in the cyber world, are security systems that monitor
the traffic coming in or going out of a network [1]. However, as
the systems get more complex and interconnected, intrusions
find more sophisticated instances and get out of the cyber-only
world. Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) are where the cyber and
physical worlds meet. They are usually mixtures of IT systems
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or networks and electro-mechanical entities. Examples of such
systems are self-driving cars [2], remote surgical robots [3, 4]
and smart power grids [5, 6].
Attacks launched on CPSs can cause damages in the real
world and that will make their security a big concern in the
coming years. With the realization of Industry 4.0, this threat
becomes even bigger. A simple cyber attack on one CPS
can create a cascade of failures in a complex interconnected
system.
The previously-existing channels of intrusion, including
computer networks [7], can open the vulnerability window to
the CPS of network-controlled type. There are many instances
of such systems around. For example, new vehicles, including
smart vehicles, use Controller Area Network (CAN) bus to
connect different micro-controllers governing the physical
components of a vehicle. With the emergence of Internet of
Vehicles (IoV) and Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANET) [8]
and connection of smart vehicles to the outside world for
e.g. Over The Air (OTA) software updates or information
gathering, this threat has become even more serious [9]. In July
2015, Fiat Chrysler recalled 1.4 million cars after two hackers
demonstrated how to penetrate and control a Jeep Cherokee
remotely by using e.g. the car’s entertainment system which
is supposedly connected to the mobile data network [10, 11].
Such incidents drew the attention of researchers to the security
of vehicles’ CPSs [12].
The issue is that, more and more vehicles are relying on
networked control systems whose collision domains or buses
are shared with (or have a route to) the units connected to
the Internet. The isolation is at best, enforced by some sort
of software defined network (SDN) controller. This makes
the attack surface larger and any misconfiguration can open
a window to the internals of smart vehicle.
Classic Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) were built to spot
anomalies in the world of computer networks. However, in a
CPS, analyzing the traffic alone without knowing the effect of
each packet effect on the physical system, one cannot judge
about its maliciousness.
Reference [13] has categorized CPS threats and defined a
new family which is so called the covert attacks. Covert attacks
are a subset of deception attacks in which an attacker takes
control of some parts of the CPS, e.g. the control signal over
the network channel, but tries to keep the attack effect small
enough so that it is not detected by human observers. There
are two types of covert attacks; one tries to create steady-
state errors on the output of physical entity to e.g. exhaust or
degrade the service performance over the time and the second
2type tries to create transient effects on the CPS output, perhaps
repeatedly over a long period to achieve the same goal.
Inspired by the definition of covert attacks, this paper
proposes two covert attacks on Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC)
systems. In the first one, the attacker waits for the reference
e vehicle to lower its speed and at the right moment and by
creating a spike in the acceleration or manipulation of the
controller reference, tries to cause an accident or increase its
chance. In the second one, the attacker takes over the cruise
controller and manipulates the reference signal to lower the
distance to the reference car so that the risk of accidental
crash is increased.
We then propose an intrusion detection mechanism for such
covert attacks. This IDS takes advantage of a reference model
trained by an observer to mimic the system response as closely
as possible. A significant deviation from the expected behavior
will make the IDS trigger an alarm and switch to the fail-safe
controller embedded in the IDS or compensation system.
In order to evaluate the efficacy of the proposed detection
and compensation scheme, we conducted extensive simula-
tions by using Matlab Simulink platform. The results show that
the proposed detection method successfully discloses covert
attacks on AAC systems and the compensator, which is a
simple embedded P controller, also manages to substantially
reduce the attack impact on the system compared to when no
protection mechanism is employed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II
the model of the ACC system is described and its control
goals are presented. Section III presents novel covert attack
strategies on the ACC system and their corresponding com-
pensation plans. Moreover, the IDS system is designed in this
section. Section IV tests the IDS as well as its compensator in
a simulation setup and discusses the results. Related studies are
reviewed in Section V. The paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. THE ADAPTIVE CRUISE CONTROL
In this section, we look into the description of the ACC
system and its control goals. An ACC model is depicted in
Fig. 1 (a) and Fig. 1 (b). A vehicle, called ego, is assumed to
be equipped with ACC system. The ego vehicle has a radar to
measure the distance to the front vehicle, which is so called
the lead vehicle. The lead vehicle is presumably driving in the
same lane as the ego vehicle. In addition, the relative velocity
is measured by the sensor/radar. The control objectives of the
ACC system is to make the ego vehicle travel at a driver-
specified speed as long as it maintains a safe distance with
the lead vehicle.
There are two modes that the ACC system controls the ego
vehicle with. In the first one, the speed (of the ego vehicle)
is set to a driver-set speed as long as a minimum distance
is maintained with the lead vehicle. In the second mode, the
space between the two vehicles is controlled (by changing the
ego vehicle’s speed) so that the two vehicles do not get closer
than a safe distance. According to real-time measurements,
either working mode can be enabled by the ACC system. For
example, if the relative distance is considerably decreased, the
ACC systems switches from mode 1 to mode 2. Likewise,
if the distance goes beyond a threshold, the ACC system
switches from mode 2 to mode1. To determine the ACC
system operating mode, the following rules are considered:
• If Drel > DSafe, then the speed control mode is active.
Track the driver-set velocity. Vset is the goal.
• If Drel < DSafe, then the space control mode is active.
Keep a safe distance with the lead vehicle. DSafe is the
goal.
A. ACC Mathematical Model
The model dynamics of the lead and ego vehicles are the
same. Let x, v = x˙, a = v˙ = x¨ denote the position, velocity,
and acceleration of vehicles, respectively. A simple first order
equation expressing the car cruise control operation is shown
below:
x˙ego(t) = Fv(Drel(t)) (1)
Drel(t) = xlead(t)− xego(t) (2)
where Fv is a velocity function that explains how the ego
vehicle chooses to go, given that its distance to the lead vehicle
is Drel. The function Fv(Drel) can be learned from the sensor
data taken along the road, or can be inferred from human
driving behaviors. A key modeling weakness of the first order
model is that it is not exactly possible for drivers to choose
their velocity, because vehicles have inertia due to their mass.
Therefore, different velocities can usually be achieved only via
gradual acceleration or deceleration. The second order model
describes this via Newton’s laws of motion:
x¨ego = Fa(xlead − xego, x˙lead − x˙ego, x˙ego) (3)
Here Fa(Drel, vrel, vego) models the acceleration of the ego
vehicle as some nonlinear function of the distance to the lead
vehicle, the relative velocity to the lead vehicle, and the the ego
vehicle velocity. Two second order models are the following-
the-leader and the optimal velocity models. The following-the-
leader model is characterized by:
x¨ego = α
x˙lead − x˙ego
xlead − xego
(4)
where α is a constant parameter. The optimal velocity model
is as follows:
x¨ego = β(Fv(x˙lead − x˙ego)− x˙ego) (5)
in which β is a constant parameter. In the the following-the-
leader model, each vehicle has its own velocity related to its
lead vehicle’s velocity. In the optimal velocity model, there
is a velocity function Fv(Drel) and the ego vehicle velocity
relates to that optimal velocity that corresponds to the given
spacing xlead − xego. The two models can also be combined
as follows:
x¨ego = α
x˙lead − x˙ego
xlead − xego
+ β(Fv(x˙lead − x˙ego)− x˙ego) (6)
As mentioned before, the model dynamics of the lead and
ego vehicles are the same. For both ego and lead vehicles,
the dynamics between acceleration and velocity in Laplace
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Fig. 1. Demonstration of Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) in different modes along with the control goals in each case: a) The relative distance is greater
than the safe distance, b) the relative distance is smaller than the safe distance. c) The ACC loop is closed via in-car network that delivers the control and
feedback signals.
domain are modeled as:
G(s) =
1
s(0.5s+ 1)
(7)
which approximates the dynamics of the throttle body and
vehicle inertia. The inputs of the ACC system are the driver-
set velocity Vset, time gap Tgap which is the time gap between
the vehicles, velocity of ego vehicle Vego, relative distance to
the lead vehicle Drel, and the relative velocity to the lead
vehicle Vrel (which is given by the vehicle radar). The output
of the ACC system is the acceleration of the ego vehicle.
The safe distance between the lead and ego vehicles is
calculated as follows [14]:
Dsafe = Ddefault + TgapVego (8)
where Ddefault is the standstill default spacing and Tgap is
the time gap between the vehicles.
III. INTRUSION DETECTION AND COMPENSATION
In this section, we assume that the ACC system is prone to
covert or stealth attacks which disrupt the control operation.
First, we introduce two attack scenarios for the ACC system.
Then, we design an intelligent intrusion detection system for
ACC. Then, a novel idea is presented to compensate the effect
of the detected intrusions in both scenarios.
A. Covert Attack Scenarios
As mentioned in the previous section, the ACC system
operates in two modes; the speed control mode and the
space control mode. In this paper, two attack scenarios
are studied which target these control objectives of the
ACC system. Both attack scenarios are covert by definition.
They intrude the ACC system and change its output. In
other words, the attacker disrupts the acceleration of the
ego vehicle to change the normal operation of the ego vehicle.
Attack Scenario #1: The first stealth or covert attack
starts with compromising the ACC unit. The attacker remains
dormant and monitors the measured distance to the front
vehicle while letting the ACC do its job. At the times this
distance is at its lowest (presumably near the minimum safe
distance), it creates a spike in the control signal and makes
the vehicle accelerate, hoping that by temporally lowering
the distance to something less than the standard or increasing
the speed to something above the limit, the chance of having
accidents is increased. This could similarly happen when the
front vehicle suddenly brakes and the compromised ACC
refuses to reduce the speed.
Attack Scenario #2: The attacker compromises the
ACC unit similar to the first attack, however, unlike the first
scenario he/she does not ambush for the attack. The attacker
trivially lowers the ACC’s reference distance i.e. DSafe in
this scenario. Therefore, during the times ACC is in mode
2 and tries to maintain the safe distance, it is practically
following a false reference which gets the ego car closer to
the lead vehicle than it really should be. However, since this
difference is trivial and not noticeable to the driver, this attack
remains covert or stealth. The result is not trivial though.
Statistically speaking, depending on the road condition (e.g.
4wet or dry), the braking power of the lead and ego vehicles,
and the ego vehicle’s driver reaction time, the chance of
having accidents considerably increases.
B. Intelligent Intrusion Detection
Accuracy in detection and reaction times are important
issues in CPS security. Reaction time is critical to prevent
the process failures. Early detections increase the chance for
compensator to maintain CPS performance.
We propose to use an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to
spot the covert attacks introduced. We assume that there is
an initial safe interval during which an identifier learns the
CPS/plant dynamics. This could be as simple as a transfer
function identification for linear systems. The initial safe
period assumption is not unreasonable since a vehicle is not
hacked or infected by a worm as soon as it comes out of the
factory.
Therefore, we assume that attacks, if there are any, are
launched after Tattack seconds. An intelligent identifier is used
to construct a model of the CPS while it operates in the
safe interval. The identifier we employ is an artificial neural
network.
In this study, we suggest using adaptive hard thresholds to
detect anomalies. The sum of modeling errors and quantization
errors (as a result of digitizing the signals and passing them
through the network) form a residual error (Yout − Ynn)
based on which IDS determines the detection threshold. This
error statistical data is collected from the plant during the
safe operation interval. Hypothetically speaking, if the ag-
gregated errors have a Gaussian distribution in the state ψi,
the alert threshold should be set to µi ± kσi [1]. Here, k
is a constant coefficient and µi and σi are the mean and
std of the Gaussian error distribution in system state ψi.
According to [1], the probability of getting a false positive
equals 2Q(k) = erfc( k√
2
). Decreasing false positives usually
results in an increase of false negatives. Therefore, k should
be selected in a way that significant deviations are captured
and small perturbations are ignored. The proposed scheme for
detection and compensation of the malicious attack in the ACC
system is demonstrated in Fig. 2.
C. Control Systems and Compensation Strategies
In this study, we take a model predictive control (MPC)
system as the main ACC core. The MPC system controls
the vehicle in the normal mode. If the IDS that monitors
ACC behavior, detects an anomaly, it means that an attack
has happened. Therefore, IDS switches from the main control
system to the compensator in order to alleviate the effect of
attack (on the the ego car).
As mentioned, the core of ACC is an MPC which applies
the linear model of the system, disturbance and noise models
to estimate the state of the control system and also anticipate
the system future outputs. By using the anticipated outputs, the
MPC solves a quadratic programming optimization problem to
provide optimal adjustments for variables. The structure of an
MPC system is shown in Fig. 3.
The compensator proposed in this study is a PID control
system. The reason for this choice is the popularity of this
family of controllers in industry and the low cost of embedding
such a unit inside the intrusion detection and compensation
system. In a case study, we design P controllers to compensate
the effect of covert attacks in the scenarios introduced before.
IV. EVALUATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The proposed scheme for the ACC system described in
Section II is illustrated in Fig. 2. As mentioned before, the
ACC system is prone to malicious attacks. We introduced two
types of covert attack scenarios in subsection III-A. In this
section, the proposed strategies for detection and compensation
are applied to the smart vehicle system. The parameter values
used in the simulations are as follows: The initial positions
for the lead vehicle and the ego vehicle are x0,lead = 50 (m)
and x0,ego = 10 (m). The initial velocities for the lead
vehicle and the ego vehicle are v0,lead = 25 (m/s) and
v0,ego = 20 (m/s). Additionally, we assume that Tgap =
1.4 (s), Ddefault = 10 (m), vset = 30 (m/s), aego, min =
−3 (m/s2), and aego, max = 2 (m/s
2) .
A. Intelligent Intrusion Detection System
The results of applying the proposed intrusion detection
system is shown in Fig. 4. The attack has been launched
at t = 40 s in both scenarios. As observed, the IDS alert
flag is raised almost immediately. Therefore, the compensating
system, which is a duplicate but simple replacement for the
ACC unit, is enabled after the detection of covert attacks.
B. Compensation of Covert Attacks - Attack Scenario #1
As mentioned before the first covert attack scenario is re-
lated to the speed control goal. The attacker tries to accelerate
(the ego vehicle) when the lead decreases its speed and the
distance between the two cars gets lower, right at t = 40s as
shown in Fig. 4 (a) and Fig. 5 (a). As a result, the gap between
the two cars gets smaller than the safe distance temporarily.
This can be done repeatedly, however, only one attack instance
has been shown in the figures. The indicators of the attack are
visually hidden from the driver. The increase in acceleration
and the reduction in car-to-car distance are not big enough to
draw the attention of the ego diver, thus it remains stealth even
after t = 40s. However, the probability of accidents has been
increased, at least in the short time window(s). With the IDS
employed, the ACC system is taken over by an embedded P
controller upon attack detection. The attack is detected shortly,
after around 200ms. One can verify from Fig. 5 (b) that the
vehicle has managed to operate normally after t = 40.2s since
IDS has taken the infected controller out of the loop and has
put the embedded compensator in charge.
C. Compensation of Covert Attacks - Attack Scenario #2
As mentioned before, in the second covert attack scenario,
the attacker tries to disrupt the reference of the ACC system,
especially in mode 2, such that the gap between the two
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Fig. 2. The proposed scheme for detection and compensation of malicious attacks into the adaptive cruise control system.
Fig. 3. Model predictive control system [15].
vehicles remains below the safe distance. The IDS reaction
to this attack is shown in Fig. 4(b). Since this is a covert
attack, the driver of the ego vehicle does not necessarily sense
any fluctuations in acceleration, as observed in Fig. 6 (a).
However, the relative distance gradually grows smaller and
after around 60s, the effective gap between the two vehicles
is reduced by almost 5m. This might not be noticeable (in
50m) by the driver but considerably increases the chance of
accidents, especially when the lead car has good brakes and
the ego car does not. Similar to the previous scenario, if
the embedded P compensator is enabled upon IDS signal, it
manages to overcome the side effects of the attack. As the
plots in Fig. 6(b) show, the attack is again detected in less
than 200ms and the control goal is fairly satisfied after a small
transient disturbance.
As the simulation results show, the proposed intrusion
detection and compensation strategy is quick and effective.
It can ensure the relative distance between the ego and lead
vehicles does not get smaller than the safe distance.
V. RELATED WORK
We discuss the related work in some issues of intrusion de-
tection and compensation in CPS and intelligent transportation
systems, especially Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs).
The issue of CPS security has received considerable atten-
tion ever since Stuxnet [16] struck. Intrusion detection in CPS
and IoT systems has been realized by applying many classic
and intelligent methods. In [12], artificial neural networks were
applied to detect intrusions which may happen in vehicular
networks. In [17], an intrusion detection system (IDS) has
been designed for Home Area Networks (HAN). The IDS is
based on ZigBee technology, because ZigBee is dominant in
HANs. Abnormal patterns of the network is detected using
deviations from normal behavior.
Deception attacks are considered instances of the man-in-
the middle (MITM) attack, e.g. false data injection. False data
injection attacks in electric power grids and wireless sensor
networks are studied in [18–20]. In these papers, the attackers
are deemed to be aware of the system information as well
as the controller. Therefore, they proposed covert attacks on
physical systems. In [21] and [22], Packet delay and Denial
of Service (DoS) attacks are modelled as stochastic processes
in which the attacker launches zero-dynamic attacks on the
system. Also, the stealth attacks for linear time invariant
systems has been studied. Other viewpoints and algorithms for
time-based IDS have been proposed in [23]. Bound checking
of execution micro-timings has been proposed to be adopted
by application(s) in order to detect intrusions during a self test
procedure.
In [13], a covert attack has been studied for the purpose
of service degradation. The goal was to study how covert
attacks change the performance of networked control systems.
In this paper, the attacker identifies the model of the plant and
the controller. Then, the attacker determines what actions can
damage the system, either in a short period or in the long run.
Short-time attacks are designed to create overshoots on the
system output and long-term service degradation attacks aim
creating a noticeable steady state errors. In [1], an intrusion
detection and compensation system is proposed for CPS to
fight covert attacks. Errors of the output and its estimation are
used for artificial neural network IDS. An intelligent controller
is also designed to compensate the effect of attacks and it
can replace the classic controller upon the attack detection. In
[24], a hybrid strategy is applied to provide a tolerant control
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Fig. 4. The intelligent intrusion detection system output for the two covert attack scenarios. The attack time is t = 40 and the detection time is not much
later than the attack time. (a) The first attack scenario. (b) The second attack scenario.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
time (sec)
-4
-2
0
2
4
Acceleration
ego
lead
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
time (sec)
15
20
25
30
35
Velocity
ego
lead
set
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
time (sec)
40
50
60
Distance between two cars
actual
safe
(a)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
time (sec)
-4
-2
0
2
4
Acceleration
ego
lead
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
time (sec)
15
20
25
30
35
Velocity
ego
lead
set
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
time (sec)
40
50
60
Distance between two cars
actual
safe
(b)
Fig. 5. The first attack scenario. (a) There is not any compensation strategy. (b) The P Controller is applied to compensate the malicious attack occurred into
the ACC system.
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Fig. 6. The second attack scenario. (a) There is not any compensation strategy. (b) The P Controller is applied to compensate the malicious attack occurred
into the ACC system.
for compensation of cyber attacks launched on the inputs and
outputs of a CPS of rotary gantry type. The malicious attacks
studied in this paper is Denial of Service (DoS) attacks which
cause packet loss in the control input and sensor output. In
this paper, several classic and intelligent controllers have been
studied in terms of robustness and effectiveness against cyber
attacks. The authors in [25] took a different approach regarding
the security of CPS. Instead of proposing an IDS, they showed
how one can build an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) for
real-time cyber physical systems in general. Their approach
results in a zero false-positive firewall whose rules are written
automatically by an algorithm from dataset.
Intelligent transport systems are one of the major elements
of smart cities [26]. Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs)
have become a key component of the intelligent transport sys-
tem. VANETs provide safety information for both drivers and
passengers. There are many issues and limitations in VANETs
in practice [27–29]. They include network volatility, delay-
sensitive applications, network scale, heterogeneity, wireless
link usage, multi-hop connection, anonymity, etc. Some types
of attacks affect the operation performance of VANETs [27,
30]. Attacks are categorized into insider (launched by internal
authorized malicious vehicles) and external (launched from
outsiders). From another perspective, attacks are classified
as passive and active. Reference [31] also classifies attacks
into four main groups which pose (1) a risk to wireless
interface, (2) a threat to hardware and software, (3) a hazard
to sensors in-put in vehicle and (4) a danger behind wireless
access (in the infrastructure). Malicious attacks in VANETs
can be message spoofing, message replay attack, integrity
attack, impersonation attack, Denial of service (DoS) attack,
De-anonymization attack [32], movement tracking, etc.
In [33], data security and privacy issues in intelligent
transportation systems have been studied. In this paper, it has
been assumed that data streams are coming out of vehicles and
go to road side units. A group formation in the vehicular layer
is proposed in which the (group) leader can communicate with
the members as well as the road side unit. A lightweight per-
mutation mechanism is applied to preserve the confidentiality
and privacy of sensory data.
In [34], an algorithm is presented that can detect jamming
attacks of DoS type in VANETs. In the proposed detection al-
gorithm, multiple malicious nodes and irrelevant nodes can be
detected and isolated from the routing network. In [35], an IDS
is proposed which can be used in the wireless and dynamic
networks, like VANETs. A novel algorithm, which contains a
feature extraction method as well as a hierarchical classifier,
has been developed for intrusion detection in VANETs. The
”differences of traffic flow” and ”position” are the two main
features that should be extracted. The classifier works based
on relabeling and recalculating mechanisms.
8VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, detection and compensation of covert intru-
sions into adaptive car cruise control system (ACC) were
studied. Two scenarios for covert attacks on ACC were in-
troduced such that the ACC system is not able to satisfy
the speed and space control goals of the smart vehicle. An
artificial neural network identifier was proposed to learn the
ACC system and predict its outputs. The IDS system works
based on comparison of the actual ACC outputs with those
of the identifier that received the same inputs. Anomalies are
captured by statistical measures and they raise a flag that
switches the MPC system to an embedded PID controller.
Simulation results confirmed that the proposed approach was
effective in the sense that it both achieved detecting the covert
attacks and mitigated their effects on the performance of tested
vehicle.
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